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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
Ryan Ellroy Farabee, : Case No. 20000972-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the trial court failed to meet the requirements set forth in the Rule 11 of 
the UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and the United States and Utah Constitutions, 
this Court should order the trial court to permit Farabee to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Under relevant provisions of Rule 11 and the Constitutions, the trial court is obligated to 
make a clear record of the legal elements and factual basis underlying a plea. In addition, 
the trial court has a further obligation to ensure a defendant's understanding of the law in 
relationship to the underlying facts. The trial court erred in denying Farabee's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas because the court record failed to reflect sufficient affirmation 
that Farabee was apprised of and understood all elements of the offense to which he was 
permitted to plead guilty. 
In addition, this Court should order the trial court, to permit Farabee to withdraw 
his guilty pleas because the pleas were induced by trial counsel's representations to 
Farabee that he would "never do prison time", but would do "thirty to ninety days in jail.' 
At a minimum, this Court should remand for re-sentencing, because there is reasonable 
likelihood of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance of 
trial counsel at sentencing. The trial court judge indicated that he was unsure of the 
sentence to impose in this case, and trial counsel was aware of, but failed to introduce 
highly relevant evidence that supported Farabee's quest for probation and would have 
countered highly damaging and unreliable testimony that was presented by the 
prosecution. Trial counsel's inappropriate misrepresentations and failure to even attempt 
to mitigate inaccurate testimony which was damaging to defendant constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel which prejudiced the defendant and the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was plain error. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA WAS PLAIN ERROR 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
constituted plain error. Under Rule 11, all guilty pleas must be made in a knowing and 
voluntary manner. Furthermore, as a matter of safeguarding the integrity of the judicial 
process, Utah law requires courts to ascertain the terms of plea bargains and their 
voluntary nature on the record. See e.g., State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986). 
Failure to strictly comply with any aspect of Rule 11 constitutes good cause for the 
withdrawal of the plea as a matter of law. See e.g., State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987). 
Rule 11(e)(4) requires the courts to establish that the defendant understands both 
the elements and nature of the offense, and also requires the courts to establish a factual 
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basis for the plea. The failure to clearly establish the elements of the offense and 
establish the necessary facts underlying a guilty plea is an independent constitutional 
basis for withdrawal of the plea, because a plea cannot be characterized as 
constitutionally voluntary unless the record reflects that the defendant understands the 
law in relation to the facts and admits sufficient facts to justify the conviction. See e.g., 
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that when the record did not demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and 
elements of the crime charged, the defendant could not voluntarily plead guilty. State v. 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). More recently, this Court reiterated the need 
for an explicit record of the defendant's understanding of the relationship between the 
law and the facts. In State v. Ostler, the Court stated, if a defendant "does not understand 
the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled guilty," his guilty plea is 
involuntarily made. 996 P.2d 1065 (Utah 2000), affd, 2001 UT 68; Breckenridge, 688 
P.2d at 443-44. Furthermore, a defendant's "understanding of the elements of the 
charges and the relationship of the law and the facts may not be presumed from a silent or 
incomplete examination." State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332,1335 (Utah App. 1989). 
Accordingly, a trial court's "failure to inform a defendant of the nature and elements of 
the offense is fatal to a guilty plea conviction." State v. Pharris. 798 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
The law governing voluntary guilty pleas and withdrawals of guilty pleas was at 
the time of trial and should have been obvious. The defendant has thereby met his 
burden of demonstrating plain error. 
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A. THE PLEA ENTERED BY DEFENDANT AND ACCEPTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS INVOLUNTARY BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE 
AN ACCURATE RECORD OF THE ELEMENTS. 
In the matter at hand, the plea entered failed to comply with Rule 11 or the related 
constitutional law because the trial court failed to make an accurate record of the relevant 
elements or factual basis underlying the plea, or of Farabee's understanding of the law in 
relationship to the facts. The plea affidavit underlying Farabee's guilty pleas to two 
counts of first degree felony rape does not state the elements correctly, but states the 
following: 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT VICTIM'S CONSENT. 
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: I HAD 
SEX WITH MARGARITA ESPINOSA ON 2 OCCASSIONS WHEN SHE WAS 
14 OR FIFTEEN YEARS. 
(R. 17). The court order in the plea affidavit makes no mention of the elements or 
finding of a factual basis or Farabee's understanding, specifically of the element 
concerning consent. The plea affidavit makes no mention of whether consent could or 
could not be obtained in this case. Furthermore, during the plea colloquy, the trial court 
failed to complete their discussion on whether consent was or was not obtained in this 
case. The trial judge stated at one point that although "consent is difficult to have with 
someone who is 14 or 15 years old . . . , it can be had." R. 75:8-9. The discussion 
following this statement involved only the Prosecutor and Defense Counsel coming to a 
conclusion on whether they believed lack of consent was present, but the court failed to 
complete the requirement of ensuring that Farabee understood that the court held that 
lack of consent was implied from the facts. In failing to discuss this matter with Farabee 
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himself, the trial court failed to demonstrate and preserve on record that Farabee 
understood the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty. Such error is fatal 
is "fatal to the guilty plea conviction." Ostler, 996 P.2d 1065 (Utah 2000), affd. 2001 
UT68. 
Because the trial court failed to preserve on record, that Farabee understood the 
elements of the crime in relation to the facts of his case, before accepting Farabee's guilty 
plea, the trial court accepted an involuntary plea in violation of the U.S. and state 
constitutions and in violation of Rule 11. 
Furthermore, because the trial court accepted Farabee's guilty plea when the plea 
was made in violation of Rule 11 and the constitutions, and thereby rendered 
constitutionally involuntary, the trial court committed plain error when it denied 
Farabee's Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea. Defendant has met his burden of 
demonstrating that this error "should have been obvious, meaning that 'law was clear at 
the time of trial' and that he was prejudiced by the error." State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 
259 T| 22, 53 P.3d 486 (citations ommitted). The trial court's error in failing to follow 
this law was not only plain, but also prejudicial because the pleas were fundamentally 
flawed and invalid upon entry and should have been withdrawn upon motion. See State 
v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). 
IL 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that trial counsel was ineffective 
and that as a result of trial counsel's deficient performance, defendant was prejudiced. To 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate that trial 
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counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation and 
professional judgment, and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688(1984); See e.g., Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 
516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). In addition, to satisfy the prejudice 
requirement, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203. Specifically, in 
the context of a guilty plea, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 
P.3d203. 
In the matter at hand, trial counsel's performance did fall below objectively 
reasonable standards of representation and professional judgment when he guaranteed 
Farabee that he "would never serve prison time" and when trial counsel failed to object to 
and remedy the false testimony offered by the victim's mother. 
A. TRIAL COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATIONS TO DEFENDANT 
EFFECTUATED A "GUARANTEE" THAT DEFENDANT WOULD NOT BE 
SENTENCED TO PRISON, AND SUCH REPRESENTATIONS DID PREJUDICE 
THE DEFENDANT. 
Regardless of the credibility of trial counsel's testimony at the plea withdrawal 
hearing, it was inappropriate for trial counsel to make representations that Farabee would 
not serve prison time. Although appellee argues that trial counsel did not "guarantee" 
that the defendant would not be sentenced to prison, trial counsel did acknowledge that 
he "significantly downplayed" the possibility of being sentenced to prison. Moreover, 
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trial counsel stated that, "I told him he would do some brief time, some period of time in 
the Grand County Jail but then he would be out and would never do prison." R. 118:25 
(emphasis added). 
These statements project more than mere opinion, rather they could reasonably be 
construed as counsel guaranteeing that defendant would not serve prison time if he plead 
guilty. There is no evidence that trial counsel stated that prison was a possibility, and that 
trial counsel could not guarantee any result. 
Appellant does not dispute that trial counsel may have been within reason in 
recommending that Farabee accept responsibility for his actions in hopes of receiving a 
lenient sentence; however, trial counsel committed the fatal error of offering statements 
that could likely be construed as a guarantee that defendant would not serve a prison 
sentence if he plead guilty. This conduct was objectively unreasonable and fell below 
objective standards of representation and professional judgment, thereby rendering trial 
counsel's assistance ineffective. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688; See, e.g., 
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 524 (Utah 1994). 
B. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AT SENTENCING BECAUSE HE 
FAILED TO ATTEMPT TO MITIGATE INACCURATE AND DAMAGING 
TESTIMONY. 
While the Appellant does not question the reasonableness of trial counsel's 
strategy of presenting Farabee as penitent and willing to accept responsibility for his 
crimes, the Appellant does dispute the trial counsel's failure to refute false, damaging 
testimony offered by the victim's mother. The record before this Court reflects that the 
trial court was vacillating between a prison sentence and probation because he did not 
know whether to believe Farabee or what the victim's mother said at the sentencing 
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hearing. (R. 76 at 22). The victim's mother testified that Farabee had "groomed" the 
victim and that he was currently "grooming" her younger daughter. (R. 76 at 18-19). 
Trial counsel failed to sufficiently object to these statements. Trial counsel was given an 
opportunity to respond to the question of whether Farabee maintained that [M.E.] 
initiated sexual contact when Farabee was minding his own business (R. 76 at 19). 
Rather than offering evidence suggesting that the trial court should lean toward imposing 
probation rather than a prison sentence, trial counsel responded that Farabee felt a mutual 
attraction between him and [M.E.] and that rather than acting appropriately, Farabee 
allowed the relationship to go along (R. 76 at 20). 
Finally, trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing when he failed to notify the 
court that the State's witness was biased based on the fact that her husband had molested 
Farabee's wife in the past, and that her testimony could potentially be tainted by this bias 
(R. 52-53). Trial counsel recognized that he should have subpoenaed the victim for the 
sentencing hearing instead of assuming that she would be there, because he needed to 
examine the victim at the sentencing hearing to challenge the untrue assertions made by 
the victim's mother (R. 118 at 28). In addition, trial counsel recognized that he should 
have asked for a continuance to address this error but did not do so. (R. 118 at 28). 
Trial counsel's failure to present the relevant and reliable evidence to counter the 
testimony of M.E.'s mother and to support Farabee's position constituted objectively 
deficient and unreasonable performance, because having a criminal sentence based on 
reliable evidence is a fundamental element of due process of law. See State v. Wanosik, 
31 P. 3d 615, 616 (Utah 2001)(in reversing a sentence apparently imposed solely on the 
basis of the defendant's absence, the Court observed,u 'The due process clause of Article 
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1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution requires that a sentencing judge act on a reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence, "'(quoting 
State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985), cert granted, 42 P.3d 951, 2002 Utah 
LEXIS 44.) Given the trial court's stated uncertainty about the sentence (R. 76 at 22), 
there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result had trial counsel presented the 
evidence confirming Farabee's account of how the offenses transpired and revealing the 
bias of M.E.'s mother. Therefore, counsel's objectively deficient performance was 
prejudicial. 
While the ultimate sentence in this case was obviously within statutory limits, the 
manner in which is was imposed was unlawful. Under Martinez, the trial court should 
have recognized that because Farabee opted to enter his guilty pleas on the basis of trial 
counsel's representations that he would never serve prison time for pleading guilty to two 
first degree felony rapes that trial counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient. In 
addition, there is a reasonable probability that Farabee would not have entered his guilty 
pleas in the absence of trial counsel's objectively deficient performance, and the trial 
court should have permitted Farabee to withdraw his plea. Furthermore, because 
Farabee's guilty plea was involuntary and the court accepted the plea in violation of Rule 
11 and U.S. and state constitutions, thereby effectuating a plain error, and because 
Farabee's trial counsel was ineffective and trial counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced Farabee in violation of due process of law, the manner in which Farabee's 
sentence was imposed was unlawful. See Kay, 717 P.2d 1294; Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309: 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440; Wanosik, 31 P.3d 615,616 (Utah 2001). The trial court 
failed to meet its burden imposed by Rule 11 and the U.S. and state constitutions when it 
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took Farabee's plea when it failed to make a clear record of the legal elements and factual 
basis underlying the plea, and Farabee's understanding of the law in relation to the facts. 
Furthermore, this Court should order the trial court to permit Farabee to withdraw his 
guilty plea because the plea submitted in court not only failed to meet the requirements of 
voluntariness, but the plea submitted in court was induced by inappropriate 
misrepresentations by trial counsel and trial counsel failed to introduce highly relevant 
evidence that the State's witness offered testimony that was likely biased. 
IIL 
THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON FARABEE'S PLETHYSMOGRAPH RESULTS IN 
SENTENCING VIOLATED DUE PROCESS 
Finally, the trial court erred when it relied on Farabee's Plethysmograph results in 
determining that Farabee should serve a prison sentence rather than granting probation. 
Under Utah law, a conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand. It 
is a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt. 
State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480 (Utah 1989) (citing Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 
U.S. 199(1960). 
Although Utah courts have yet to expressly address the issue of whether the use of 
Plethysmograph results is permissible in sentencing, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
the issue in Ramsey. The Ramsey court implied that the reliability of Plethysmograph 
testing requires proper foundation. Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 486. 
In the case at hand, the court was waivering between imposing a prison sentence 
or probation. Ultimately, the court, stating, 
Well, I'm really struggling with this one. I—I don't know that 
it's been established to my satisfaction or that it's been established 
clearly that the defendant... exploited his relationship as uncle 
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[However], I read in the . . . ISAT report 'he manifested his highest 
levels of arousal to scenarios depicting sexual interactions with consenting 
adult females, but he also manifested similar levels of arousal to scripts 
detailing nonconsensual sexual interaction with female children.' 
That worries me." 
relied primarily on the Plethysmograph results represented in the ISAT. (S.R. 21, ff 17-
20; 22 ff 9-14. Utah law requires that sufficient foundation be laid before relying on 
polygraph and breathalyzer tests. See Harry v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 
1987), relying on Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 412 (Utah App. 1987). The Utah 
Court of Appeals held that results of a breathalyzer test were inadmissible due to the 
absence of an affidavit establishing proper maintenance of the breathalyzer machine or 
that the test was administered by a qualified operator. Individuals or entities relying on 
the Plethysmograph test should similarly be required to establish proper maintenance and 
administration by a qualified operator. 
Plethysmograph tests are similar in nature to breathalyzer tests because both tests 
are technical in nature and can both be determinative of an individual's guilt or 
innocence. The breathalyzer determines presence of alcohol in the human body, the 
Plethysmograph purports to detect the propensity of individuals to commit sexual 
offenses. 
In the case at hand, no evidence was offered pertaining to the reliability and 
accuracy of the Plethysmograph test and the individual administering the test, therefore, 
the state failed to sufficiently establish adequate foundation for the admission the 
Plethysmograph test as required by Utah law. 
Finally, although trial counsel failed to object to the admissibility of the 
Plethysmograph test results, thereby preserving the issue for appeal, this Court should 
inquire into the admissibility of the Plethysmograph test because trial counsel's failure to 
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object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and his deficient performance unfairly 
prejudiced the defendant. 
Conclusion 
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court for withdrawal of Mr. 
Farabee's guilty pleas or at a minimum, remand for re-sentencing. 
DATED this 15th day of April, 2003. 
^ CA 
K. ANDREW FIT; 
Counsel for Mr. Fafal 
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